With the availability of quantitative data on the transcriptome and proteome level, there is an increasing interest in formal mathematical models of gene expression and regulation. International conferences, research institutes and research groups concerned with systems biology have appeared in recent years and systems theory, the study of organisation and behaviour per se, is indeed a natural conceptual framework for such a task. This is, however, not the ®rst time that systems theory has been applied in modelling cellular processes. Notably in the 1960s systems theory and biology enjoyed considerable interest among eminent scientists, mathematicians and engineers. Why did these early attempts vanish from research agendas? Here we shall review the domain of systems theory, its application to biology and the lessons that can be learned from the work of Robert Rosen. Rosen emerged from the early developments in the 1960s as a main critic but also developed a new alternative perspective to living systems, a concept that deserves a fresh look in the post-genome era of bioinformatics.
INTRODUCTION
We see an ever-increasing move towards inter-and trans-disciplinary attacks upon problems in the life sciences. The reason is the diversity of organisation and behaviour in natural systems. The size of data sets and complexity of patterns hidden in them has led to a renewed interest in mathematical techniques that allows us to identify formal models of natural systems. The next step in the postgenome era is not simply assigning biological function to identi®ed genes but to analyse the organisation and control of genetic pathways. These pathways are of course dynamic systems; non-linear, adaptive and anticipatory systems to be precise.
Systems biology is an emerging ®eld of biological research that aims at a systemlevel understanding of genetic or metabolic pathways by investigating interrelationships (organisation or structure) and interactions (dynamics or behaviour) of genes, proteins and metabolites. Recently, international conferences, institutes, 1, 2 research groups and articles, 2 focusing on systems biology, have appeared. The reason for this renewed interest in systems thinking is the rapid technological advance in the area of genomics. Genomics is the ®eld of biological research taking us from the DNA sequence of a gene to a structure of the product for which it codes (usually a protein) to the activity of that protein and its function within a cell and, ultimately, the organism. Crossing several scale-layers from molecules to organisms, we ®nd that organisms, cells, genes and proteins are de®ned as complex structures of interdependent and subordinate components whose relationships and properties are largely determined by their function in the whole. This de®nition coincides with the most general de®nition of a system as a set of components or objects and relations among them. 3 Systems theory is then the study of organisation and behaviour per se and a natural conclusion is therefore to consider systems biology as the application of systems theory to genomics.
The idea to use systems theory in biology is, however, not new; notably in the 1960s a number of eminent researchers took a systems approach tò search for general biological laws governing the behavior and evolution of living matter in a way analogous to the relation of the physical laws and nonliving matter'. 4±6 It was the transfer of ideas from physics to biology and the perception that biological systems are a special case of physical systems that led to criticism which cumulated in the most comprehensive discussion of the limitations of`classical' systems biology in the work of Robert Rosen. 7±10 In the following sections, we review the need for mathematical modelling, the usual approaches to modelling biological systems and problems arising from them. In this paper we will focus on Rosen's relational biology,`metabolic-repair' (M,R)-systems, his discussion of anticipatory behaviour and causality. We show that, for metabolism and repair de®ned as mappings, replication is implicitly de®ned. Anticipatory behaviour or intrinsic control is realised through the boundary conditions of the repair and replication map. Finally, it can be shown that the category that de®nes the (M,R)-system is rich enough in entailment to allow the repair and replication maps to be entailed by something and hence avoiding a ®nality argument when discussing causal entailment.
THE CASE FOR MATHEMATICAL MODELLING
The engineering sciences are a good example of how mathematics has been used effectively in a wide range of applications. One could argue that many biologists ®nd themselves now in a similar situation to engineers about six decades ago when they were faced with the need to analyse and control complex dynamic systems for which empirical means are inappropriate. Also, both species, engineers and biologists, are not born as mathematicians. Engineers have learned to use mathematics towards their ends and a symbiosis of researchers from both areas should allow both to advance successfully. For the engineer, the underlying strategy is to represent the natural system by a set of random and/or state variables and then to investigate relationships among those variables within a formal system ( Figure  1 ). This approach cumulates into a philosophy whereby, as Henri Poincare Â suggested,`the aim of science is not things in themselves but the relations between things; outside these relations there is no reality knowable.' 11 The importance of what we now call systems biology was pointed out by Norbert Wiener in his book`Cybernetics, on Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine', published in 1948. 12 In 1970, cybernetics or feedback regulatory mechanism on a molecular level were described by Jacob and Monod 13, 14 who investigated regulatory proteins and the interactions of allosteric enzymes in particular. Organisms as a whole are self-regulating, adaptive and anticipatory systems and numerous examples have been published. While the control of physiological mechanisms requires the processing of information, the actual processes are sustained by energy The modelling relation between a natural system N and a formal system F.
8 If the modelling relation brings both systems into congruence by suitable modes of encoding and decoding, it describes a natural principle. In this case F is a model of N, that is, N is a realisation of F obtained from the environment. The acquisition, transfer and utilisation of energy have subsequently been seen as major components in the analysis of biological systems. 15 Systems biology has a past and the books by Ashby 4 and Bertalanffy 5 are a`must read' for anyone attracted to the area of systems biology. Bertalanffy provides a general introduction of system theory but also reviews applications in biology with a discussion on models of open systems and organisms considered as physical systems. For an up-to-date account of the systems sciences, including a historical perspective, the reader is referred to Klir's book 3 and the Principia Cybernetica Web. 16 Speci®cally referring to applications in biology, the volumè Systems Theory and Biology' edited by Mihajlo Mesarovic Â 17 is valuable. Minhajlo Mesarovic Â initiated and developed one of the most comprehensive mathematical systems theories. 18, 19 The most extensive discussion of systems thinking in biology is James G. Miller's book on a`general theory of living systems'. 20 Miller provides the most detailed account of living systems in eight levels of increasing complexity ± from molecules to cells, organs, organisms and societies. Reality is described as a continuous dynamic process, best represented as a system of systems and natural systems are studied as a structure of processes evolving through spatio-temporal events. The conclusion is that despite the endless complexity of life, it can be organised and repeated patterns appear at different levels. Indeed, the fact that the incomprehensible presents itself as comprehensible has been a necessary condition for the sanity and salary of scientists.
CAUSING PROBLEMS
The principal purpose of mathematical models applied in the natural sciences is to identify sets of rules, statements about local associations or dependencies among variables. In genomics, mathematical models may be expected not only to describe associations but also to explain dependencies among genes. A`causal law', which is not strictly bound to any speci®c philosophical perspective, is then understood as a`causal dependency', a general proposition by virtue of which it is possible to infer the existence of an event from the existence of another. It is the explanatory aspect of mathematical modelling that leads us to the limits of systems biology but it is also the most exciting aspect of the developments in the post-genome area. We ®nd that thè causal problem' is an ontological, not a logical question, it cannot be reduced to logical terms but it can be analysed with the help of formal reasoning. In the words of Bertrand Russell:`Inferences of science and common sense differ from those of deductive logic and mathematics in a very important respect, namely, when the premises are true and the reasoning correct, the conclusion is only probable.'
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The ®rst comprehensive theory of causation was Aristotle's. It distinguishes four types of cause: the material cause (or stuff ), the formal (formative) cause (or shape), the ef®cient cause (or force) and the ®nal cause (or goal). For a formal logical system, given an`effect', say proposition P, axioms correspond to the material cause of P, production rules are understood as the ef®cient cause of P and the speci®cation of particular sequences of production rules or an algorithm is identi®ed as the formal cause. For a dynamic system a state can itself be entailed only by a preceding state. If for a chronicle f(n, f (n))g we ask why the nth entry gives the particular value f (n), the answer is because of the initial condition f (0), ie f (0) is the material cause; and because of a state transition mapping T for which f (n 1) T [ f (n)], ie T corresponds to the ef®cient cause; and because of exponent n from which f (n) is obtained by iterating the transition map n times beginning with f (0); ie n refers to the formal cause. As shall be discussed in further detail below, in Rosen's relational biology, for a component f : A 3 B, such that a U 3 f (a), the question`why f (a)?' is answered by`because f ' and Causality `because a'. In other words,`a entails f (a)' or formally f A (a A f (a)). Here f corresponds to the ef®cient cause of (`effect f (a)'), and a refers to the material cause of f (a). One of Rosen's achievements is that he introduced a formalism rich enough in entailment to allow ®nal causation without implying teleology. The conceptual framework in which he developed his relational biology is category theory.
22,23

TOWARDS A RELATIONAL BIOLOGY
The problems of applying systems theory in biology can be summarised by (a) the dif®culty of building precise and yet general models, (b) the`openness' of biological systems, the fact that these systems are hierarchical and highly interconnected, and (c) that models based on differential equations cannot represent anticipatory behaviour as present in cellular processes.
Modelling systems with sets of ®rst order differential equations,
the rate of change of observable (state variable) f j depends only on present and past states but cannot be dependent upon future states. In other words, these systems can only be reactive but not anticipatory.
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The reactive paradigm embodies one of the most important assumptions of science: effects should not precede their causes. And yet simple biological systems suggest the notion of self-reference, an implicit model of knowledge of itself.
The following example of a biosynthetic reaction network is due to Robert Rosen 8 (see also Casti 24 ). Let metabolites A i represent the substrates for the enzymes E i that catalyses it at stage i. As illustrated in Figure 2 , the initial substrate A 0 activates the enzyme E n (ie increases its reaction rate). Under the foregoing hypotheses, with concentration A 0 at time t the concentration of A n at some future time is predicted in order to maintain homeostasis in the pathway. The ambient concentration of A 0 serves as a predictor, which in effect`tells' the enzyme E n that there will be an increase in the concentration A nÀ1 of its substrate, and thereby pre-adapts the pathway so that it can deal with the expected changes. The second problem faced by representing cellular processes with sets of linear differential equations is captured by Zadeh's uncertainty principle: 25 As the complexity of a system increases, our ability to make precise and yet signi®cant statements about its behavior diminishes until a threshold is reached beyond which precision and signi®cance (or relevance) become almost exclusive characteristics.
The problem is that perturbations to cells have multi-gene/multi-transcript/multiprotein responses,`closing' the system, ie restricting the model to a small set of variables, inevitably leads to an often unacceptable level of uncertainty in the inference.
The tradition of describing cellular systems in terms of energy and masses with forces acting on them is rooted in the realm of Newtonian mechanics. In this context a system is closed by internalising external in¯uences through added state variables and more parameters to the system. Take for example the simplest of dynamical systems, a single 
with v denoting the velocity which, in turn, is de®ned as rate of change of position or displacement x from some origin of coordinates. Conceptual closure amounts to the assumption of constancy for the external factors and the fact that external forces are described as a function of something inside the system:
where è is a parameter speci®c to the system under consideration. Rewritten as a set of ®rst order differential equations, this system has two state variables, f 1 denoted by x and f 2 denoted by v, where
The model is deterministic in that the object's state at time t is fully determined from the initial conditions (if known) and therefore permits the prediction of future states by integrating the set of differential equations. Newton's laws of motion, which state that the acceleration of an object is directly proportional to the force acting on it and inversely proportional to its mass, imply that the future behaviour of a system of bodies is determined completely and precisely for all time in terms of the initial positions and velocities of all the bodies at a given instant of time, and of the forces acting on the bodies. These forces may be external forces, which arise outside the system investigated, or they may be internal forces of interactions between the various bodies that make up the system in question. Rosen described the response of a system to forces as thè inertial' aspect while the exertion of forces by the system corresponds to the system's`gravitational' aspect. To study an open system it is therefore necessary to consider thè outside', the environment, in order to understand what is going on`inside'. The Newtonian paradigm, underlying the traditional approach to modelling biological systems, is frequently seen as synonymous with reductionism and its failure to supply the whole from its parts. On the basis of this analysis and continuing the work of Rashevsky, Rosen argued his case for a new approach, called relational biology. He emphasised that we must look for principles that govern the way in which physical phenomena are organised, principles that govern the organisation of phenomena, rather than the phenomena themselves. Relational biology is therefore about organisation and describes entailment without states. The association of energy or matter, described by states
Relational biology
and dynamical laws, is to be replaced by the description of a system in terms of its components, their function and contribution to the organisation of the system. An example of this approach for molecular systems is Rosen's concept of metabolism-repair or (M,R)-systems.
METABOLISM-REPAIR SYSTEMS
Driven by technological advances and the sequencing of genomes, at present, more hypotheses are generated than tested. However, with the availability of data, biologists will soon return to re®ned biological questions,`zooming in' to speci®c genetic pathways. With the boom in bioinformatics, the attempts to explain genetic systems are likely to proceed from the Cartesian metaphor, viewing organisms as performing computations, describing biological principles in the same way as machines are. This tradition has its roots in Newtonian mechanics and formal logic, embodied in reductionism. As we witness a shift of focus from molecular charaterisation to an understanding of functional activity in genomics, this strategy is prone to repeat historical failures as outlined in Rosen's Comprehensive inquiry into the nature, origin, and fabrication of life'. 9 As bioinformaticians dream of in silico models of cellular systems, Rosen developed a new biology on paper. Starting from the modelling relation, illustrated in Figure 1 , he began by considering two natural systems N 1 and N 2 as analogues when they realise a common formalism F. This relation of analogy between natural systems is then independent of their material constitution. The formal system F is relational, consisting of a set of formal, interrelated, components. Any two natural systems that realise this formalism are said to manifest a common organisation. In relational biology a component is de®ned by a mapping f : A 3 B where the`identity' of the component is embodied in the mapping itself, while the in¯uence of surrounding components of the natural system N and the external environment are embedded in the speci®c arguments in the domain A on which the mapping can operate.
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the cell in the face of external disturbances. The latter requires the processing and utilisation of information to permit the control of what the cell does and characterising its temporal characteristics. Essential for the maintenance of life, both components are closely interrelated in jointly sustaining the steady state. 15 Rosen devised a class of relational cell models called metabolismrepair (M,R)-systems to characterise the minimal organisation a material system would have to manifest or realise what is called a cell. 9 The present section addresses Rosen's answer to the problems of causation and anticipatory behaviour described above. We are going to review Rosen's arguments and show (in the abstract) that the presence of`metabolism' and`repair' components imply the existence of a`replication' principle. The key point is that replication comes without in®nite regress in modelling and hence allows the discussion of ®nal causation while avoiding the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes (teleology). To achieve this, we require a conceptual framework rich enough in entailment ± such as category theory.
Let A represent the set of environmental inputs to the cell, while B (M, R)-systems is the set of outputs, ie products the cell is capable of producing. The mapping f could be described as an abstract enzyme', which converts substrate a P A into`product' b P B:
Further, let r(A, B) be the set of metabolisms that are realisable by the cell, ie a set of mappings from A to B. As pointed out by Casti, 26 the set of physically realisable cellular metabolisms r(A, B) is determined by various physicochemical constraints and the classical Newtonian machinery has been used to capture many aspects of the cell's metabolic activity in respect of the mapping f above. However, both Rosen and subsequently Casti have argued that these formalisms lack a structure to account for repair and replication. The purpose of repair is to stabilise cellular metabolic activity against¯uctuations and disturbances in both its environmental inputs and in the metabolic map f itself. In other words the repair is to copy f while we refer to replication as the process of copying the repair mechanism.
To arrive at a repair mechanism we consider the following diagram:
In the diagram, a entails f (a) and referring to the discussion in the section oǹ causing problems' we can answer the question`why f (a)?' in two ways: because a entails f (a) and because f acting on a entails f (a). We can summarise the entailment in the diagram by
If an element b P B is entailed, then it must lie in the range of mapping f and we can write f (a) b for some element a in the domain of f and obtain
Suppose the set C in the diagram denotes the collection of mappings from A to B, r(A, B), we then ®nd that g in fact generates a new f for any b P B. In other words, g(b) is itself a mapping such that g entails f :
g( f (a)) f
In this case we denote this`repair map' by Ö and illustrate the repair process by the following augmented diagram:
To allow some form of internal control, the repair map Ö converts the abstract products b into new versions of f :
For any speci®c activity, we denote the metabolism for which the cellular process is designed by f Ã ; ie in the absence of disturbances, given the environmental input a Ã P A, f Ã produces the cellular output b Ã P B. If there is a disturbance to the metabolic function f Ã or a change from the environment a Ã , the cell repairs' the situation by generating new f Ã for any b Ã . The repair or control is implicit in the boundary condition of the repair map Ö. If there is neither a change from the metabolic map f Ã nor from the environment a Ã , then Ö ought to produce f Ã :
stabilising the cell's metabolic behaviour in response to external in¯uences and/or errors. While in the simple diagram (1), representing a metabolism, we could answer the question of`why f (a)', f itself was unentailed. The ®nality argument would be to answer`because f ', f is to bring A into B and yet f is itself unentailed if we had not Ö in place. However, with the introduction of the repair function Ö A ( f (a) A f ), the question`why f ?' is answered`because Ö', Ö being the ef®cient cause of f and because f (a)', where f is entailed by its value, the material cause.
The construction of the repair map
Causal entailment
immediately poses the question to what replicates Ö? One solution is to add yet another function to the diagram (2) but this would lead to an in®nite regress in the discussion of causal entailment. The cell's metabolic processing apparatus, through information stored in the DNA, allows replication and it was Rosen's major achievement to show that, using category theory, 22, 23 replication is in fact already built into the scheme outlined in diagram (2). Although we can add a replication map to the diagram, we do not need to argue for this map through an addition to (2) as it already implicitly exists.
To arrive at this conclusion, we view the quadruple (A, B, f , Ö) as a simple (M,R)-system on the category C. A category comprises a collection of objects such as A, B and associated arrows (mappings) such as for example f : A 3 B, where A is the domain of f and B its co-domain. The collection of all mappings with domain A and co-domain B is denoted r (A, B) . We suppose that C is a concrete category, ie its objects are structured sets and its arrows are mappings compatible with their structure. If C is closed under cartesian products, ie if A, B, C, D are objects of C, f P r(A, B), and g P r(A, B) are maps of C, then A 3 C and B 3 D are objects of C, and f 3 g P r(A 3 C, B 3 D), where ( f 3 g)(a, c) ( f (a), g(c)), then for r(A, B) de®ning an object in C, we introduce for this special case a new notation:
In (3) above we have in fact assumed that r(A, B) B A is an object in the category to which A and B belong because only then can B A be the range of another mapping in the category and hence can be entailed within the category. In other words, for Ö to entail f , the exponential (function set or map object) B A must exist. Note that B A does not necessarily exist as an object in C; there is, for example, no analogous construction in the category of monoids. If B A exists as an object of the category C, it is associated with the existence of a special evaluation mapping e:
Note that we use subscript f in e f not to denote a dependency on f but to distinguish it from evaluations associated with maps other that f .
Returning to our cellular (M,R)-system
the map Ö is an element of the set of mappings from B to the set of mappings from A to B:
For this set to exist as an object in the category C, following the general model (4), there then must exist the evaluation map
The existence of the evaluation map e Ö can be explained as follows. The value f Ö(b) can be viewed as depending on two things: b as well as Ö. Although we do not usually think that way with functions, there is no reason why Ö is ®xed in the setting of (M,R)-ststems. We can express this dependency on both Ö and b as a two-valued mapping
Suppose we want to evaluate this map, which we denote by h for now: we can describe this as a two-step process which effectively turns the mapping h(Ö, b) of two variables into a map H(Ö) of one variable Ö but with values H(Ö) which are a function of the second variable b.
The formal de®nition of this map H reads
where Ö P (B A ) B and b P BX
Category theory
Here each value H(Ö) is a function of b, hence an element of the exponential set:
In formula (7) on the left-hand side the mapping H(Ö) is evaluated at argument b and h may therefore be called an evaluation map and denoted by e Ö , leading us to the de®nition in (6). Our reasoning so far can be summarised as follows. For Ö, the repair of f , being entailed by something (being replicated), it is required that the set of mappings from B to B A exists as an object in C. Then, if such a map object (exponent) exists, it is associated with the evaluation map e Ö . The evaluation map in turn was explained by the bijection
between functions h in two variables and those H in one variable but which maps into (B A ) B , the space in which Ö resides! In other words, given the metabolic function f : A 3 B, and repair map Ö : B 3 B A , these imply the replication of Ö. With replication of Ö in place, we can introduce a replication map, denoted Ç ,
such that Ö is entailed by f . As previously de®ned for the repair map, the boundary condition for a stable operation is Ç ( f ) Ö f . The boundary conditions are important as they de®ne the (M,R)-systems as a controlled process. In conventional control engineering the existence of a separate control component is assumed. The control action is an external in¯uence on the process and we may refer to this type of control as extrinsic (exogenous). For (M,R)-systems there is no direct control input and the separation between controller and process is not recognisable (intrinsic or endogenous control). Instead thè anticipatory regulation' is implicit in the boundary conditions for Ö and Ç . The boundary conditions imply an internal self-model of the cell. Given A, B and r(A, B), it is possible to directly construct the maps Ö f Ã and Ç f Ã , ie repair (of metabolism f ) and replication (of the repair map Ö) emerge`naturally' from the existence of an abstract metabolic component. An argument in support of theoretical or mathematical biology is that such results, abstract they may be, are neither the outcome of in vivo, in vitro or in silico analysis but can also be obtained, on papyrusF F F. We can realise an (M,R)-system in different ways and initially automata theory was considered. However as demonstrated by John Casti, 26 since Rosen introduced the concept, considerable advances in the mathematical theory of dynamic systems should enable us to take his ideas further. Casti developed a theory of linear (M,R)-systems. 27 In the model above we can consider a as an input time-series leading to output b. The input/output space A and B are then ®nite-dimensional vector spaces whose elements are sequences of vectors from R m and R p respectively:
Mathematical causation is acknowledged by the fact that the ®rst output appears one discrete time step after the ®rst input. If f is further assumed to be linear and constant (autonomous), we can express the relationship between cellular inputs and outputs by the following equation:
where A k P R p3 m denotes the coef®cient matrix that characterises the process.
The (M,R)-system consists of
With a linear realisation (9) we are now in a position to investigate how the (M,R)-system restores or stabilises disturbances in the cellular environment a and/or metabolic map f . A change in the external environment, a Ã 3 a, for a ®xed metabolic map f Ã leads to f Ã (a) b new subsequently to Ö( f Ã (a)) f new . For a stable process, we require that f Ã (a) f Ã (a Ã ) or f new (a) b Ã for the cell to recover fully from the disturbance. The cell's metabolic activity would be permanently changed to f new if Ö( f new (a)) f new . If we had Ö( f new (a)) f Ã , then the cell's metabolism would only undergo periodic changes cycling back and forth between f Ã and f new . In case of a ®xed environment a Ã , ®xed repair map Ö f Ã with a disturbance f Ã 3 f , we require Ö f Ã ( f (a Ã )) f Ã in order to restore the original designmetabolism f Ã . This in fact describes a map f U 3 Ö f Ã ( f (a Ã )). Let us denote this map as follows
We may ®nd that for disturbances f the repair mechanism stabilises the system to Ö f Ã ( f (a Ã )) f Ã but in some cases the system could settle for the new metabolism f such that Ö f Ã ( f (a Ã )) f . This situation is represented by ®xed points of the map Ø f Ã ,a Ã . One such ®xed point is of course f Ã , for which our basic system is working normally such that
Casti addresses other biological questions such as mutations and Lamarckian inheritance. 24, 26 We may conclude that Rosen's somewhat abstract formulation of (M,R)-systems, initially argued for by calling upon category theory and thereby allowing us to reason about more fundamental properties of cellular systems, has also more`applied' formulations in the form of sequential machines and linear dynamic systems. The formal tools required for such an analysis are familiar to control engineers. John Casti described various properties of such systems and established further links of these ideas to a number of other areas of science and engineering. 24, 27 The, for many, unexpected link between biological questions and engineering analysis should encourage control engineers in particular to take an interest in systems biology. We can expect that over the coming years new technology will allow us to measure gene expression in time. Similar approaches to those discussed here should then be developed to study gene interactions.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The principal aim of systems biology is to provide both a conceptual basis and working methodologies for the scienti®c explanation of biological phenomena. System theory is not a collection of facts but a way of thinking, which can help biologists to decide which variables to measure and to validate their`mental models'. Frequently it is the process of formal modelling rather than the mathematical model obtained that is the valuable outcome (Figure 3) . In engineering it is a common experience that we often learn most from those models that fail. The purpose of a conceptual framework is therefore to help explain unknown relationships, to make predictions and to help design experiments, suggesting to us which variables to measure and why. Or, as the mathematician David Hilbert once noted, we might think that`there is nothing more practical than a good theory'.
The need for mathematical models becomes apparent as we begin to analyse the organisation and control of genetic pathways. The complexity of molecular processes combined with the dif®culties in observing them and measuring quantitative data lead inevitably to uncertainty in their analysis. Mathematical models, providing suf®ciently accurate numerical predictions, are possible in some cases as demonstrated in the areas of metabolic engineering and control. With applications in biotechnology the inner structure of models in this area is less important than the ability to replicate observable phenomena in simulations. If however, on the other hand, we are trying to answer more fundamental questions regarding the mechanisms, principles or causal entailment in genetic pathways, we ®nd that the ancient problem of causality haunts us once again.
Differential equations may be used to model a speci®c form of causal entailment in natural systems; the equations by themselves, however, do not state that changes are produced by anything, but only that they are either accompanied or followed by certain other changes. Considering d f adt ö(t) or equivalently d f ö(t)dt, it merely asserts that the change d f undergone during the time interval dt equals ö(t)dt. The notion of causality is not a syntactic problem but a semantic one; it has to do with the interpretation rather than with the formulation of theories or formal systems. In other words, hypothesising causal entailment in general, and gene/protein interactions in particular, remains a task of the biologist, possibly supported by his or her choice of mathematical model (conceptual framework). As problems of genomics become conceptual as well as empirical, and models are expected to explain principles rather than just simulating them, we are therefore likely to witness interesting debates on the merits of alternative theories.
Scienti®c theories deal with concepts not with reality, and mathematical models are representations, not re¯ecting what things are in themselves. All theoretical results are derived from certain formal assumptions in a deductive manner. In the biological sciences, as in the physical sciences, the theories are formulated as to correspond in some useful sense to the real world, whatever that may mean. Energy or matter is the primary object of physics. Its study in the phenomenal world is based on changes and for anything to be different from anything else, either space or time has to be presupposed, or both. Immanuel Kant identi®ed the concepts of space, time and causality as a priori and therefore conditional for experience. Changes in space and time are the essence of causal entailment and as the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer discovered, the subjective correlative of matter or causality, for the two are one and the same, is the understanding.`To know causality is the sole function of the understanding and its only power. Conversely, all causality, hence all matter, and consequently the whole of reality, is only for the understanding, through the understanding, in the understanding'. 28 In his famous essay`What is life?', 29 the physicist Erwin Schro Èdinger comes to the conclusion that`our sense perceptions constitute our sole knowledge about things. This objective world remains a hypothesis, however natural', echoing Albert Einstein's observation that`as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. ' The work of Robert Rosen is important in that he not only identi®ed the weaknesses of our common approach to represent natural systems but he also outlined a possible way to transcend the reactive paradigm in order to obtain representations of anticipatory systems. Rosen was looking for ways to characterise molecular and genetic systems in a general way and quite independently of their physical or chemical constitution. His (M,R)-systems, which are reviewed here, are unlikely to become a methodology that is useful to biologists. However, they serve as an example of a mathematical study of basic biological principles. His conceptual framework arose from a criticism of the transfer of principles of Newtonian physics to biology. It is in this context that his work deserves renewed interest in the postgenome era of biology and bionformatics.
One of the challenges for the emerging ®eld of systems biology is then to link abstract mathematical models, like for example (M,R)-systems, to speci®c current problems of genomics. An important difference from the 1960s is the availability of three types of gene expression data at different levels: genome level (sequences), transcriptome level (microarrays) and proteome level (mass spectroscopy, gel techniques). In particular with microarrays we can now conduct time course experiments, generating data suitable for time-series analysis. With the shift of focus from molecular characterisation to an understanding of functional activity in genomics, systems biology can provide us with methodologies to study the organisation and dynamics of complex multivariable genetic pathways. What are then the conditions for systems biology to succeed?
Mihajlo Mesarovic Â wrote in 1968 that in spite of the considerable interest and efforts, the application of systems theory in biology has not quite lived up to expectations F F F one of the main reasons for the existing lag is that systems theory has not been directly concerned with some of the problems of vital importance in biology.' His advice for the biologists was that progress could be made by more direct and stronger interactions with system scientists.`The real advance in the application of systems theory to biology will come about only when the biologists start asking questions which are based on the system-theoretic concepts rather than using these concepts to represent in still another way the phenomena which are already explained in terms of biophysical or biochemical principles F F F then we will not have the``application of engineering principles to biological problems'' but rather a ®eld of systems biology with its own identity and in its own right.' 6 
